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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ON JURIES
Defendant, a Negro, was indicted for first degree murder as the
result of a stabbing altercation. The jury found defendant guilty.
Defendant claimed that Negroes were wilfully and systematically
barred from the jury in violation of the "equal protection of the
laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court ex-
cluded defendant's evidence showing that no Negro had been a
member of a criminal grand or petit jury in the county for the
past thirty years. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. The
U. S. Constitution does not require proportional representation, but
does necessitate a fair jury selected without regard to race. The
defendant must prove a purposeful discrimination, but when shown
that no Negro had served on the jury for thirty years, the burden
shifted to the State to show that this was not due to racial dis-
crimination. Bailey v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 510, 62 S. E. 2d 28
(1950).
Exclusion of Negroes from the jury trying a Negro is a fertile
ground for appeal in the South. After slavery was abolished, the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 largely to protect the
Negro from inequality.' In 1879 an appeal from the Virginia courts
afforded the U. S. Supreme Court an opportunity to uphold this
purpose. It did so by declaring that the "equal protection" clause
guaranteed to any colored man that upon selection of jurors to pass
upon his life, liberty, or property, there could be no intentional
exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against him because
of his color.2 The court explfiined that this did not mean defendant's
race. was entitled to proportional representation on each jury3 or
even that on any particular jury could he require the presence of
a member of his race. Thus in that case defendant's allegation that
he was a Negro, and that there were no Negroes on the jury trying
him for the murder of a white man, was held insufficient as a matter
of law to warrant interference with the state court proceedings.
The defendant must prove4 intentional exclusion 5 of his race, and
this may be an insurmountable task, at least in a state or lower
federal court. For example, in Binyon v. U. S.,6 the Court of
Appeals was unimpressed with a showing that in a district heavily
populated with Negroes, no member of that race had served on a
grand jury for four years or on a petit jury for three years. In
Watkins v. State,' there was a showing that while 42% of the popu-
lation were Negroes, only 1.8% (44 out of 2,493) were included
in the jury box from which. the trial jury was drawn. Noting that
the requirement placed upon the commissioners was the picking
of men of "uprightness and intelligence" and that as a matter of
common knowledge illiteracy among Negroes exceeded that among
whites, the Georgia Court found no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Generally, the proof is sufficient if defendant shows
that there have been no Negroes on the jury for many years and
that there were a substantial number of Negroes qualified for jury
service.!
Where the jury commissioners continually over a considerable
period of time place a lone Negro on each jury, this should he
evidence of discrimination against Negroes in the selection of white
persons for the remaining eleven, just as much as continual com-
plete exclusion constitutes such evidence, but here it has been more
difficult for the defendant to prove such discrimination to the
satisfaction of the courts?
Yet several recent Supreme Court cases have been liberal in
favor of the Negro. In Cassell v. Texas,"° the court found dis-
criminatory the practice of selecting one, but only one, Negro for
each grand jury. The court gave no weight to the statement of the
commissioners that they knew of no Negroes qualified to serve,
asserting that upon appointment it became their duty to acquaint
themselves with qualifications of members of the community. In a
more extreme decision of this year" the court reversed per curiam
a judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida on the grounds that
the method of jury selection discriminated against the Negro race
although Negro jurors were selected in proportion to the number
of Negro and white voters, and there was one Negro on the grand
jury which indicted the appellant.
Intentional inclusion of all Negroes on the jury has been held not
to discriminate against a Negro defendant and thus not to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
2
The decision of the Bailey case is in accord with the law as ex-
pressed in decisions of the 0. S. Supreme Court. Yet the language
used by the court, "the Constitution requires a fair jury selected
without regard to race," is broad enough to indicate that there can
be neither deliberate exclusion or inclusion of any kind. It is sub-
mitted that this more nearly concurs with the impartiality originally
intended by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Virginia the Code requires a jury for a criminal case to be
obtained in the following manner. The judge of the circuit court
appoints as jury commissioners for one year, not less than two, nor
more than five persons out of those qualified for jury service. 3
Such qualified persons are, in brief, those who are twenty-one years
of age, residents of the State for at least one year and of the locality
six months preceding call, 4 excluding idiots and lunatics, certain
types of criminals, inmates of charitable institutionsI and certain
persons specified by statute."6 After appointment each of the jury
commissioners must take an oath to the effect that he will honestly
perform his duties without favor or prejudice, will select only
persons having a reputation for intelligence and honesty, who have
not requested selection and who will endeavor to promote only the
impartial administration of justice." The jury commissioners must
soon after appointment prepare a list of not less than 100 nor more
than 300 names, certain specified cities being allowed up to 1,000.18
Commissioners must fold or roll up each name so that it is not
visible on the outside and then deposit it in a locked box.19 The
clerk or his deputy must draw 24 names from this box in the
presence of the judge or, if absent, then a commissioner in chancery
and a reputable citizen, or if the commissioner is absent, then in the
presence of two reputable citizens.'
Two points in the selection of a jury are most open to attack as
discriminatory: Making the jury list and drawing the jurors'
names. In view of the growing watchfulness of the Supreme Court,
now recognized by our Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the
Bailey case, it is submitted that a sufficiency of caution, lest guilty
defendants secure continued reversals on the grounds of discrimina-
tion, may dictate the appointment of a Negro commissioner in areas
having a history of few Negroes on jury service. Such a commis-
sioner would be more familiar with qualified members of his own
race. If this is not tonsidered feasible, then the presence of a repu-
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